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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to joint devia-
tions. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria were deﬁned in the literature.
One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which coalitions can
plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players re-
ceive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we show that an ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (Games Econ. Behav. 17 (1996),
80-113) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to playing a game, inﬂuences the
set of self-enforcing outcomes of a non-cooperative game. The communication
allows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated strat-
egy proﬁle as a feasible non-binding agreement. For such an agreement to be
self-enforcing, it has to be stable against plausible coalitional deviations. Two
notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a strong cor-
related equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional deviations,
and a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against
self-enforcing coalitional deviations. For a coalition of a single player any de-
viation is self-enforcing. For coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is
self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving deviation by
one of its proper sub-coalitions.
Each notion has a few alternative deﬁnitions. One major diﬀerence between
them is the stage in which coalitions can plan a deviation from a correlated
agreement. Assume that the correlated agreement is implemented by a medi-
ator who privately recommends each player what to play. The deﬁnitions in
[25,26,29] are ex-ante deﬁnitions: players may plan deviations before receiving
the recommendations, and no further communication is allowed after recom-
mendations are issued. The deﬁnitions in [9,13,30] are ex-post 2 deﬁnitions:
players may plan deviations only after receiving the recommendations.
However, in some frameworks coalitions can plan deviations at all stages. One
example for such framework is an extended game with cheap-talk 3 , where
the players can mimic a mediator, and implement a large set of strong cor-
related equilibria as strong Nash equilibria in the extended game ([18]). A
coalition can plan a deviation in the early phases of the cheap-talk when no
player has yet received his recommendation (ex-ante stage), in the late phases
when all players have received their recommendations (ex-post stage), or in an
intermediate stage when each player has some partial information about his
recommendation (as described in subsection 2.2).
A natural question is whether any of the existing notions is appropriate to
such frameworks, or whether new deﬁnitions are needed. Our main result
2 Referred to as interim in some of these papers.
3 Cheap-talk is pre-play, unmediated, non-binding, non-veriﬁable communication
among players. For a good nontechnical introduction to some of the main issues of
cheap-talk, see the survey in [14].
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shows that the existing ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium a` la Moreno &
Wooders ([26]) is resistant to deviations at all stages. The result is based on
three assumptions (which hold in the cheap-talk framework):
(1) A deviating coalition can use new correlation devices.
(2) When a coalition decides to deviate, that decision is common knowledge
among its members.
(3) The players share a common prior about the possible states of the world
in an incomplete information model a` la Aumann ([4]).
An immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria
is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria, as deﬁned in the lit-
erature referred above. One could hope that similar results might be obtained
for the coalition-proof notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that
the ex-ante coalition-proof notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which
coalitions can plan deviations at all stages. In Section 6 we discuss diﬀerent
approaches for coalitional stability, present the diﬀerent notions of strong and
coalition-proof equilibria, and discuss the implications of the main result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the main
result. The result is demonstrated in Section 3, and proven in Section 4. We
deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss the the implica-
tions of the result in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where
N is the ﬁnite and non-empty set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player
i 's ﬁnite and non-empty set of actions, and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ)
function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-linear extension of ui
to ∆ (A) is still denoted by ui. A member of A is called an action proﬁle, and a
member of ∆ (A) is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-
empty member of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted
i. Given a coalition S, let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated)
S -strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS)
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to be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
2.2 An Intuitive Description of The Framework
The framework consists of players who implement a correlated strategy proﬁle
(an agreement) q ∈ ∆(A) with the assistance of a mediator. The mediator per-
forms a private lottery, and chooses each action proﬁle a ∈ A with probability
q(a). Then he reveals to each player his recommendation by the following re-
vealing process. He makes another private lottery, possibly with a distribution
that is unknown to the players, and chooses accordingly the order in which
he reveals the recommendations. At each stage, he privately informs one of
the players a part of his recommendation, until at the end of this process,
each player knows his recommendation. During this process, the players can
communicate, share some of the information they have acquired so far about
their recommendations, and plan coalitional deviations from the agreement.
A player agrees to deviate, if given his own information, he believes that the
deviation is proﬁtable for him. If at some stage of the process, all the members
of a coalition agree to use a joint deviation, then it is implemented with the
assistance of a new mediator. The new mediator receives the recommenda-
tions of the deviating players at the end of the revealing process, and gives
each of them a new recommendation. The proﬁle q is an all-stage strong cor-
related equilibrium if, for every revealing process, and for every stage of such
a process, there is no coalition with a proﬁtable deviation.
We would like to emphasize the following points:
(1) The mediator may reveal the recommendations in parts. For example, if
the possible actions of a player are {a, b, c} ,the mediator may reveal him
ﬁrst that his recommendation is not c, and only at a later stage reveal
him that it is a.
(2) The framework allows to model a broad variety of revealing processes,
including:
• Ex-ante process ([25,26,29]) - The mediator simultaneously reveals the
recommendations at the end of the process, with no further commu-
nication among the players. Communication is only allowed before the
players receive any information about their recommendations.
• Ex-post process ([9,13,30] - The mediator simultaneously reveals the
recommendations to all the players at the beginning of the process, and
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players can only communicate afterwords.
• Polite Cheap-talk process ([18]) - The players acquire their recommen-
dations consecutively by some common known order.
• Unknown revealing process - The players do not know the order of the
revealing process.
(3) An all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is required to be resistant
against deviations in every revealing process. The main result shows
that this is equivalent to the seemingly weaker requirement of resistance
against deviations only in an ex-ante process.
(4) It is assumed that:
• The decision to implement a deviation is common knowledge in the
deviating coalition.
• If a deviation is implemented, then all the deviating players follow it:
report their true recommendations to the new mediator, follow the new
recommendations, and avoid the implementation of sub-deviations.
2.3 All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
The broad variety of revealing processes is modeled by an incomplete informa-
tion model a` la Aumann ([4]). A state space is a probability space, (Ω,B, µ),
which describes all parameters that may be the object of uncertainty on the
part of the players. We interpret Ω as the space of all possible states of the
world, B as the σ-algebra of all measurable events, and µ as the common
prior. 4
Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a random variable x : Ω→ X (where X is a
ﬁnite set), let x(E) ∈ ∆(X) denote the posterior distribution of x conditioned
on the event E. The implementation of an agreement by a mediator is modeled
by a random variable a : Ω → A, which satisﬁes that the prior distribution
a(Ω) is equal to the agreement distribution.
Deﬁnition 1 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, and (Ω,B, µ) a state
space. A recommendation proﬁle is a random variable a = (ai)i∈N : Ω → A
that satisﬁes: a(Ω) = q.
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is condi-
tionally independent of a−S given aS .
Deﬁnition 2 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
4 The justiﬁcation of the common prior assumption is discussed in [4, Section 5].
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(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω→ A a recommendation proﬁle. A deviation
(of S ) is a random variable dS = (di)i∈S : Ω → AS that is conditionally
independent of a−S given aS .
The interpretation is the following: If the players of S agree to use deviation
dS, they implement it with the assistance of a new mediator. The mediator
receives the S -part of the recommendation proﬁle, but he does not receive any
information about the recommendations of the non-deviating players. Thus,
the new recommendations he sends to the deviating players may depend only
on aS , but not on a−S .
When the members of a coalition S consider the implementation of a joint
deviation, they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may
know his recommendation, and may have additional private information ac-
quired when communicating with the other deviating players. We assume that
the deviating players have no direct information about the recommendations
of the non-deviating players. We model this by the following deﬁnition of a
consistent information structure.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coali-
tion, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle.
An information structure (of S ) is a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω (F i)i∈S,
whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists of
non-null events. We say that (F i)i∈S is a consistent information structure, if
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, a (F i(ω)) (a) = aS (F i(ω))
(
aS
)
· q(a−S | aS).
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true
state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of
F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is
proﬁtable to him, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ when playing
the original agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees
to deviate, only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. Formally, let
G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition, i ∈ S a player,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle, dS : Ω → AS
a deviation, and (F i)i∈S a consistent information structure. The conditional
expected payoﬀs of player i in ω ∈ Ω are:
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• The conditional expected payoﬀ when all the players follow the agreement:
uif (ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui (a(ω)) dµ
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the members of S deviate, by imple-
menting dS, and the players in −S follow the agreement:
uid(ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
dµ
If the players in S decide to implement a deviation in some state ω ∈ Ω, then
it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player expects to earn if the deviation
is implemented. Formally ([3]):
Deﬁnition 4 Let G be a game, S ⊆ N a coalition, (Ω,B, µ) a state space,
(F i)i∈S an information structure, and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event E ∈ B is
common knowledge at ω if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i
that contains ω.
We deﬁne a proﬁtable deviation with respect to a consistent information struc-
ture of a coalition S, as a deviation that it is common knowledge in some state
of the world, that each deviating player expects to earn more if the deviation
is implemented.
Deﬁnition 5 Let G be a game. q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
i ∈ S a player, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω→ A a recommendation pro-
ﬁle. A deviation (of S ) dS is proﬁtable, if there exists a consistent information
structure (F i)i∈S and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common knowledge in
ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). In that case, we say that dS is a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to the information structure (F i)i∈S.
We can now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviation.
Deﬁnition 6 Let G be a game. A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation.
2.4 Main Result
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a
proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information
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about the recommendations.
Deﬁnition 7 Let G be a game and (Ω,B, µ) a state space. A strategy proﬁle
q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N
has a proﬁtable deviation with respect to the ex-ante information structure
(F i)i∈S that satisﬁes ∀i,F i = Ω.
One can verify that Def. 7 is equivalent to the deﬁnition of ([26]). The deﬁnition
immediately implies that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is also an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The main result shows that the converse
is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 8 A correlated proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if
and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
in a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviation that is considered by the grand
coalition at some intermediate stage. At ﬁrst glance, one may think that this
deviation is proﬁtable to all the players conditioned on their posterior infor-
mation at that stage, but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not
the case. The analysis in this example provides the intuition for the use of a
model of incomplete information a` la Aumann ([4]), and for the main result.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
Let q be the proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
,
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium:
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• The proﬁle q is a correlated equilibrium, and thus no player has a unilateral
proﬁtable deviation.
• No coalition of two players has a proﬁtable deviation, because their uncer-
tainty about the recommendation of the third player prevents them from
earning together more than 20 by a joint deviation.
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider an intermediate stage in which player 1 has received a recom-
mendation a1, player 2 has received a recommendation a2, and player 3 has
not received his recommendation yet. No player knows whether the other play-
ers have received their recommendations. At ﬁrst look, the implementation of
the deviation d(·) = (a3, b3, c3), which gives a payoﬀ of (7, 11, 12), may look
proﬁtable for all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommendation (a1), player 1 has an expected payoﬀ
of 62
3
, and thus d is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2.
• Player 3 does not know his recommendation. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ is
10, and he would earn a payoﬀ of 12 by implementing d.
However, a more thorough analysis of player 3's information, reveals that d
is unproﬁtable for him. Player 1 can only earn from d if he has received
recommendation a1. Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d, then it is common
knowledge that he has received a1. The expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3,
conditioned on that player 2 has received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to
implement d, then he must have more information: that his recommendation
is a2. Therefore player 3 knows that if the other players agree to implement
d, then their part of the recommendation proﬁle is (a1, a2). Conditioned on
that, his expected payoﬀ is 15, and thus d is unproﬁtable for him.
4 The Proof of the Main Result
In this Section we prove the main result. As discussed earlier, one direction
immediately follows from the deﬁnitions, and we have to prove only the other
direction:
Theorem 9 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
In other words: If a proﬁtable deviation from an agreement q ∈ 4(A) exists,
then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
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PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be an agreement that is not an all-stage strong corre-
lated equilibrium in a game G. Let (Ω,B, µ) be the state space, and a : Ω→ A
the recommendation proﬁle. Thus there exists a coalition S ⊆ N with a prof-
itable deviation dS : Ω→ AS w.r.t. a consistent information structure (F i)i∈S.
This implies that there is a state ω0 ∈ Ω , such that it is common knowledge
in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) > uif (ω), i.e., Fmeet(ω0) ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. For each
deviating player i ∈ S, write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) = ⋃
j
F ij where the F
i
j are
disjoint members of F i, and let ωij ∈ F ij be a state in F ij . We now construct
an ex-ante proﬁtable deviation dSe with respect to the ex-ante information
structure (F ie)i∈S, which satisﬁes ∀i, F ie = Ω: dSe (ω) =

dS(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet
aS(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet
.
Observe that dSe and a
−S are conditionally independent given aS, thus dSe is
a well-deﬁned deviation. Let uide(ω), u
i
fe(ω) be the conditional utilities of the
players w.r.t. (F ie)i∈S. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that dSe is proﬁtable,
i.e: ∀i, uide(ω) > uife(ω). Let i ∈ S be a deviating player.
uide(ω)− uife(ω) =
∫
F ie(ω)
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (1)
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (2)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (3)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (5)
=
∑
j
uid(ω
i
j)− uif (ωij) > 0 (6)
Equation 2 is due to the equality F ie(ω) = Ω, (3) holds since d
S
e = a
−S outside
Fmeet, (4) holds since dSe = d
S in Fmeet, (5) follows from Fmeet =
.⋃
j
F ij , and
the last inequality is implied by Fmeet ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. QED.
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5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In the previous Section we have shown that an ex-ante strong correlated equi-
librium is also appropriate to frameworks in which players can plan deviations
at all stages. A natural question is whether a similar result holds for the notion
of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 5 In this Section we show that the
answer is negative, by presenting an example, adapted from [9], in which there
is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not a self-enforcing
agreement in a framework in which communication is possible at all stages.
Table 2 presents a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in Table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-proof
equilibrium. First, observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium. [26]
shows that in a two-player game, every correlated proﬁle that is not Pareto-
dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium. The proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we prove that it
is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing that any corre-
lated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let x = q (a1, b1). Ob-
serve that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 2 would have a proﬁtable
deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, be-
cause otherwise player 1 would have a proﬁtable deviation: playing a1 when
recommended a2. Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommenda-
tion proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4, and because the
payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommendation proﬁle is not in A is at
most 3, then the total payoﬀ of q is at most 4.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
5 Recall ([26]) that an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a strategy
proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation.
For a coalition of a single player any ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing. For coalitions
of more than one player, an ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further
self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
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work in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume
that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and player 1 has received a
recommendation a2. In that case, he can communicate with player 1 at the
ex-post stage, tell him that he received a2 (and thus if the players follow the
recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2), and suggest a joint de-
viation: playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2 would
believe him, and they would both play (a3, b3). This ex-post deviation is self-
enforcing because (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing in the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviation that changes
(a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 would have a proﬁtable sub-deviation: play-
ing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a deviation
that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 would have a proﬁtable sub-
deviation: playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Approaches for Coalitional Stability
We deal with self-enforcing agreements in (one-shot) games in environments
where players can freely discuss their strategies before the play starts. Such
agreements have to be stable against coalitional deviations. A few notions in
the literature present diﬀerent approaches for coalitional stability.
The ﬁrst approach, is the Pareto dominance reﬁnement, in which the set of
Nash equilibria is reﬁned by restricting attention to its eﬃcient frontier. This
approach is popular in applications due to its advantages: existence in all
games and the simplicity of its use. However, when there are more than 2
players, it ignores the ability of coalitions other than the grand coalition to
privately agree upon a joint deviation. 6
Another approach is to explicitly model the procedure of communication as
an extended-form game that speciﬁes how messages are interchanged (e.g.:
[5,15,28]). However, the results are sensitive to the exact procedure employed,
and usually strong restrictions have to be made to isolate the desired outcome.
6 As discussed in [6,35]. [35] presents a set of conditions that if satisﬁed, the two
notions of Pareto dominance reﬁnement and coalition-proof equilibrium coincide.
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A diﬀerent approach is the farsighted coalitional stability. Alternative varia-
tions are discussed in: [10,16,17,24,33,34]. 7 These notions focus on environ-
ments where deviations are public. At each stage coalitions propose deviations
from the current status-quo outcome, until nobody wishes to deviate further.
The set of possible ﬁnal outcomes is deﬁned using stable sets a` la von-Neumann
& Morgenstern ([32]). This approach is less appropriate when coalitions can
privately plan deviations. 8
6.2 Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is strong ([2]) if no coalition, taking the actions of its com-
plement as given, has an uncorrelated deviation that beneﬁts all of its mem-
bers. The main drawback of this notion, is that it exists in only a relatively
small set of games. 9 [6] presents a wider reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, which
exists in more games: a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium
is coalition-proof if no coalition has a proﬁtable self-enforcing uncorrelated
deviation. For a coalition of a single player any deviation is self-enforcing. For
coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no fur-
ther self-enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
10 The notion of coalition-proof equilibrium has been useful in a variety of ap-
plied contexts, such as: menu auctions ([7]), oligopolies ([8,11,12,31]), and
common agency games ([22]).
These notions focus on environments where coalitions can privately commu-
7 Also called negotiation-proof equilibrium and full coalitional equilibrium.
8 [34, Section 1] presents an example for the diﬀerence between a negotiation-proof
equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Observe that the negotiation-
proof equilibrium in this example, the proﬁle (U,L,A), is not a plausible outcome
if the coalition ({1, 2}) can privately deviate.
9 Examples for games where strong Nash equilibria exist are congestion games
([19]); games where the preferences satisfying independence of irrelevant choices,
anonymity, and partial rivalry ([20]); and games where the core of the cooperative
game derived from the original normal form game, is non-empty (see [21], and the
references within). Conditions for the equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria are presented in [21] (games with population monotonicity property) and
in [22] (common agency games).
10 Observe that only members of the deviating coalition may contemplate deviations
from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that members of the deviating
coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included in this
coalition. This limitation has been criticized, especially in the literature that deals
with the farsighted coalitional stability approach (described earlier).
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nicate before the play starts, and plan a joint deviation. However, they ignore
the fact that the same private communication allow the players to correlate
their moves. This deﬁciency is overcome by the notions of strong and coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. A correlated equilibrium is strong if no coalition
has a (possibly correlated) joint deviation that beneﬁts all of its members. The
close connection between strong correlated equilibrium and private pre-play
communication is demonstrated by:
• The result in [18], which shows that any punishable 11 ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game
with cheap-talk. 12
• The example in [27] of an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that is the
only plausible outcome of a game with pre-play communication, as experi-
mentally demonstrated in the referred paper.
6.3 Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
A deﬁciency of the notion of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are
six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature: three ex-ante notions and three ex-
post notions. In this subsection we present those notions, the relations among
them, and the implications of the main result.
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [26,29,25].
As discussed in Section 2, our ex-ante deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition
in [26]. In [29] deviating coalitions are not allowed to construct new correla-
tion devices, and are limited to use only uncorrelated deviations. 13 In [25]
only some of the coalitions can communicate and coordinate deviations. In
both cases the sets of feasible deviations is included in our set of deviations,
and thus our set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in the other
11 Loosely speaking, a strategy proﬁle is punishable if it Pareto-dominates another
strategy proﬁle, even when the deviating players do a joint scheme.
12 The implementation presented in [18] is only as a bn/2c-strong Nash equilibrium:
an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less than n/2 players. If
one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and one-way functions
exist, then the implementation can be as a strong Nash equilibrium (see [1,23]).
13 In [29]'s setup, the mediator can send an indirect signal to each player, which
holds more information than the recommendation itself. In that case, the uncorre-
lated deviation is a function from the set of the S -part of the signals to the set of
uncorrelated S -strategy proﬁles. In our framework, in which coalitions can use new
correlation devices, any ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that can be imple-
mented by indirect signals, can also be implemented by a direct correlation device.
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sets of equilibria.
An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be deﬁned in our framework,
as a proﬁle which is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each
player knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to to an ex-post information structure (F i)i∈S, in which:
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃ai ∈ Ai s.t. ai (F i(ω)) (ai) = 1).
Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [13,30,9].
In [13] a deviating coalition can only use deviations that improve the condi-
tional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation pro-
ﬁles. 14 In [30] a coalition S can only use pure deviations (functions dS : AS →
AS). In [9], a coalition S can only use deviations that are implemented if the
recommendation proﬁle aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviation;
(2) If aS /∈ ES, at least one player looses from implementing the deviation.
It can be shown that those conditions imply the existence of a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure. 15 Thus our set of
ex-post strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result reveals inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of
strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1. 16 Thus, [26]'s ex-ante
notion is much more robust than originally presented: It is an appropriate
notion not only for frameworks where players can only communicate before
receiving the recommendations of the correlated agreement, but to any pre-
play mediation and communication framework.
6.4 Coalition-proof Correlated Equilibria
A correlated equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a (possibly cor-
related) proﬁtable self-enforcing deviation. Again, a deﬁciency of the notion of
strong correlated equilibrium is that there are six diﬀerent variants of it in the
14 It is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω) in every ω ∈ Ω, and not
only in every ω ∈ Fmeet(ω0) .
15 The information structure is such that each deviator would know his recommen-
dation and whether aS(ω) ∈ ES .
16 See [26, Section 4] for an example of an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium that
is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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Figure 1. Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
literature (3 ex-ante and 3 ex-post). 17 It is possible to extend the model of
incomplete information, and deﬁne a notion of all-stage coalition-proof corre-
lated equilibrium, by using an appropriate notion of consistent reﬁnements of
information structures. However, the example in Section 5 shows that this no-
tion does not coincide with the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there
is any inclusion relations among the diﬀerent coalition-proof notions. 18 Thus,
the notion of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is not robust: it is sensitive
to the exact communication structure.
6.5 Extensions of the Main Result
(1) Bayesian games: [26] presents a notion of ex-ante strong communication
equilibrium in Bayesian games. The main result can be extended to this
setup as well, to show that an ex-ante strong communication equilibrium
is resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) k-strong equilibria: In [18] an ex-ante notion of k -strong correlated equi-
librium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all coalitional
deviations of up to k players. The main result can be directly extended to
this notion as well: An ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium is resistant
to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
17 Conditions for the existence of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria in
games are discussed in [9,25,26,29].
18 The example in Section 5 presents an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilib-
rium that is not an all-stage equilibrium. Based on this, it is possible to construct
a 3-player game with an all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not
an ex-ante coaliton-proof equilibrium, in which the coalition {1, 2} would have a
deviation that induces a similar situation to that described in table 2. The examples
in [9,26,29] show that there are no inclusion relations with the ex-post notions as
well.
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